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Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household
Bargaining Power
Summary
This paper further explores the role of sex ratios on spouses’ bargaining power, by
focusing on educational attainment in order to capture the qualitative aspect of mate
availability. Using Census and Current Population Survey data for U.S. metropolitan
areas in year 2000, a quality sex ratio is constructed by education brackets to test the
effect on the intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding
education bracket. We argue that a relative shortage of suitably educated women in the
spouse’s potential marriage market increases wives’ bargaining power in the household
while it lowers their husbands’. Additionally, we test the prediction that this bargaining
power effect is greater as the assortative mating order by education increases. We
consider a collective labor supply household model, in which each spouse’s labor
supply is negatively related to their level of bargaining power. We find that higher
relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple’s metropolitan area
reduces wives’ labor supply and increases their husbands’. Also, the labor supply
impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups. No such effects are found for
unmarried individuals, which is consistent with bargaining theory.
Keywords: Education, Intra-Household Bargaining Power, Labor Supply
JEL Classification: D12, J12
We thank Pierre-André Chiappori, Curtis Simon and Robert Tollison for helpful
comments and suggestions. Errors are ours.

Address for correspondence:
Sonia Oreffice
Clemson University
201 Sikes Hall
Clemson, SC 29634
USA
E-mail: oreffic@clemson.edu

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper103

2

Oreffice and Bercea: Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household Ba

1
I. Introduction
This paper examines the effects that quality sex ratios by educational attainment
have on spouses’ labor supply and bargaining power. There is evidence in the literature
that the availability of potential mates in local marriage markets, measured by the raw
number of men relative to the number of women, affects the bargaining power and
allocation of resources in already formed couples (e.g. Chiappori et al. 2002, Angrist
2002). In this study, we want to further explore the role of sex ratios on bargaining power
by constructing a refined measure of the availability of men and women based on mate
quality. We utilize educational attainment, a valuable trait in marriage by which
individuals appear to assortatively match, as a qualitative indicator (Weiss and Willis
1997, Qian 1998). We consider local marriage markets by metropolitan area and
construct a sex ratio by three education brackets (high-school graduates, some college
and college-college plus), within which individuals usually sort. Within the framework of
a collective labor supply household model, we test whether this quality sex ratio affects
the intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding education bracket
through an income effect on both spouses (Chiappori et al. 2002). That is, when the sex
ratio is favorable to the wife, (i.e. there is a relative scarcity of women in her education
bracket) the distribution of gains from marriage is shifted in her favor. In particular,
according to models of collective household behavior, if a higher number of qualified
men in the wife’s marriage group of reference increases female intra-household
bargaining power, then one would expect a reduction in wives’ labor supply, and an
increase in husbands’ labor supply. Additionally, we also test the theoretical prediction
that the bargaining power effect of such a sex ratio is greater as the assortative mating
order by education increases (Iyigun and Walsh 2005).
Do local sex ratios by education group represent an outside opportunity affecting
spousal bargaining power? Do spouses’ labor supplies depend on what happens in their
neighborhood? Is it better to be the only educated woman in a world of men? Common
sense would answer no, however matching theory and our results actually yield the
opposite answer: one is better off when is in short supply!
We use Census data by metropolitan area for the year 2000 to build our sex ratios
and data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the year
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2000 to test our labor supply prediction on married couples (using unmarried individuals
as control group). Our identification strategy consists of estimating the effects of
education sex ratios on husbands’ and wives’ labor supply for households that were
married prior to the year 2000 and comparing changes in their labor supply behavior
cross-sectionally across the US metropolitan areas.
Our empirical analysis reveals that married women significantly reduce their
supply of market labor, while their husbands increase theirs as the corresponding
education sex ratio becomes more favorable to women: a decrease of 78 and 166 annual
hours for “some college” and “college-college plus” wives, respectively, and an increase
of 53 and 129 in their husbands’ (high-school graduates do not exhibit any significant
impact). Consistent with the hypothesis of a stronger effect for higher education brackets,
we also find that couples with “college-college plus” wives exhibit a significantly
stronger impact of the quality sex ratio on their bargaining power than couples with
“some college” wives, whose estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is in turn larger than
that for high school graduates. Our bargaining power interpretation is strengthened by the
fact that unmarried men and women do not exhibit any significant reaction to the quality
sex ratio on their labor supply.
The findings presented here are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios
increase female bargaining power in the marriage market. Additionally, this evidence
represents the first empirical support of the bargaining power effect of a quality sex ratio
by education, and its stronger impact on couples with higher levels of educational
attainment.
A number of alternative explanations are also considered. The geographical
variation in the relative number of men and women by education may capture differences
in local labor market opportunities for women, in marital gains from specialization and in
welfare programs. Also, our quality sex ratio includes married and same-sex partners,
who do not represent available mates. We argue that those phenomena cannot
consistently explain our results, given their patterns, our intra-household bargaining
predictions and the empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical framework.
Section III describes the empirical specification and data. Section IV presents the
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empirical results. Section V considers alternative explanations for the findings. Section
VI concludes the paper.

II. Theoretical Background
There are two strands of economic literature that relate to our study. One strand
focuses on the impact of distribution factors, such as the sex ratio on intra-household
bargaining power, and tests their effects on spouses’ labor supply behavior (Chiappori et
al. 2002, Chiappori et al. 2005). While most empirical research on sex ratios examines
the effects of marriage, those studies develop the collective household model and
demonstrate theoretically that favorable outside marriage market opportunities increase a
spouse’s bargaining power through an income effect, measured as a reduction in labor
supply (the opposite happening to the other spouse). Because married men and women
have the option of seeking a divorce and re-marrying, more numerous potential mates in
the spouse’s marriage market of reference should enhance the bargaining power of those
already married to the extent that it enhances their opportunities outside the marriage
(Chiappori et al. 2002, Lundberg and Pollak 1996). Our paper specifically refers to this
theoretical framework. Empirically, Chiappori et al. (2002) find that higher sex ratios
reduce wives’ labor supply and increase the husbands’, using 1990 state Census and
PSID data. In a study on immigrants to the United States, Angrist (2002) argues that his
empirical results are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase female
bargaining power in the marriage market. He finds that higher sex ratios are associated
with lower female labor force participation; the effect is larger where marriage within the
same ethnic group is more prevalent. Using data at both household and aggregate level,
Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) and Grossbard-Shechtman and Neideffer (1997) show that
a sex ratio increase reduces the labor force participation and hours worked of married
women. Finally, a relevant theoretical result is provided by Iyigun and Walsh (2005),
who incorporate assortative spousal matching into the collective household model and
find that sex ratios have a stronger impact on intra-household allocations as the
assortative rank of couples rises.
The second strand of literature that relates our paper concerns the spousal sorting
by educational attainment and the gains to marriage from education. Spouses have
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increasingly similar educational attainment than in the past, especially among highly
educated people (Qian 1998). Mare and Schwartz (2005) report that today husbands and
wives are roughly 4 times as likely to have a spouse who shares their educational
background as they are to be married to someone who does not, educational homogamy
being particularly strong for college graduates. Strong sorting based on educational
attainment is also documented by Weiss and Willis (1997), with the additional finding
that similarity in schooling increases marriage stability. Schooling also has crossproductivity effects on spouses; wives’ education is found to increase the productivity
and wages of their husbands and vice-versa (Tiefenthaler 1997, Benham 1974, Chiappori
et al. 2005).
However, none of those studies explores how the distribution of educational
attainment of men and women in the marriage market affects intra-household bargaining
power, nor tests whether the impact is increasing with higher educational rank of couples.
Analyzing those effects of quality sex ratios by education is the focus of our paper.

III. Empirical Specification and Data
Identification Strategy
Our main sample consists of married couples with both spouses between 22 and
60 years of age. According to the theory, if the scarcity of educated women in the local
marriage market enhances women’s bargaining power in the household, then the labor
supply of wives should decline and the labor supply of their husbands should rise.
Additionally, couples in higher education categories should experience a stronger impact
on their labor supplies relative to other education categories. We also consider unmarried
men and women in the same age bracket, focusing on singles as a “control” group.
Singles’ labor supplies should not be affected by changes in intra-household bargaining
power1. We include intact couples only if both spouses are actually present. We exclude
widowed and separated couples to keep a clear distinction between multiple and one
decision maker households. For the same reason, we exclude singles that are not the head
of their own household, even though their sample size significantly decreases.

1

If they plan to marry in the future they may mildly experience a possible bargaining power effect in
expected value.
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The following equations for labor supply were estimated separately for wives and
husbands:
h f  h f (ln w f , ln w m , y , X , EduRatio , EduRatio * dySC , EduRatio * dyCC )  

f

h m  h m (ln w f , ln w m , y , X , EduRatio , EduRatio * dySC , EduRatio * dyCC )   m
We have also estimated a corresponding labor supply equation for unmarried women and
men, using the same specification (without spousal variables):

h u  h u (ln w u , y , X u , EduRatio , EduRatio * dySC , EduRatio * dyCC )   u
EduRatio is our sex ratio, which is constructed by three education categories, two races
and metropolitan areas. To each individual, we assign the corresponding ratio of the
number of men over the number of women in his/her own race and educational category,
living in his/her metropolitan area. For couples, our sex ratio, EduRatio corresponds to
the number of men over women that are of the same race and education category as the
wife of each household. As to race, we focus on black and white individuals and on
couples where spouses are of the same race, assuming that the relevant marriage market
is limited to one’s own race2. The coefficient of EduRatio will be common to both races,
since to each observation we assign the sex ratio of its own race, and we include both
races in our main sample. We consider the following education categories: high-school
graduates (HS), some college (SC) and college graduate- college plus (CC). HS includes
people with high-school diploma, or equivalent; SC includes individuals with some
college, but no degree or associate degree; and CC refers to bachelor’s degree and above.
We exclude high-school dropouts from our analysis because our sample should be
homogeneous, and high-school dropouts are reported to have different traits,
socioeconomic characteristics and marriage market prospects from graduates (Wolpin
1999, Rumberger 1983). Moreover, the hardest marriage market barrier to cross is
between dropouts and high school graduates (Qian 1998). We compute our sex ratio
including men and women aged 18 to 64. It is reported that measures of the sex ratio

2

Our results are robust to the inclusion of Asians, with the white sex ratio as marriage market of reference
for them.
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based on broad age ranges are satisfactory and may be preferable to sex ratios computed
for narrower age ranges (Fosset and Kiecolt 1991)3.
The interactions of EduRatio with the dummy variables for the education brackets
SC and CC (dySC and dyCC) capture the differential effect of our sex ratio for higher
education categories. The education dummies refer to the education of the wife. Our
identification strategy of the bargaining power effect consists of estimating the
coefficient of EduRatio and capturing the differential effect by education category
through the coefficients of the interaction terms. The impact of the education sex ratio on
the labor supply of high-school graduates is captured by the coefficient of EduRatio
(impact for the omitted category). The summation of this coefficient and the coefficient
of the interaction term SC (CC) measures the impact of the education sex ratio on the
labor supply of some-college (college-college plus) people. Therefore, checking the
significance of the interaction terms tests for the additional impact on couples in the SC
(CC) category.
The other regressors are the wage rate w i (of spouse i or of unmarried individual
u), household non-labor income y, and X. X includes age, experience, education of each
spouse, a dummy variable for race, number of household members and number of
(young) children in the family. X also includes state unemployment rate, state total labor
force participation and female labor force participation (with children younger than six),
to control for the level of economic activity in a state and especially for employment
opportunities. We add two measures of the prevalence of same-sex unmarried households
by metropolitan area, for homosexuals and for lesbians, in order to keep our education
sex ratio as closely related to the heterosexual marriage markets as possible. The
dependent variable in our labor supply regressions is annual hours worked, which is
defined as total annual hours worked on the longest job held in 1999. Only households in
which both spouses have positive hours of work are included in our samples. All female
3

Research shows that people consider mates drawn from relatively broad age ranges. While mean age
differences between husbands and wives are relatively small, there is considerable variation around this
central tendency as many marriages involve larger age differences. Competition and substitution across age
categories is considerable (Fosset and Kiecolt 1993). Sex ratios accounting for wives being younger than
husbands are reported to have the same impact (Chiappori et al. 2002). We also computed the sex ratio for
the age bracket 18 to 44 and got similar results.
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labor supply regressions also exhibit the same results when run with Heckman MLE to
correct for sample selection.
The labor supply estimation uses robust standard errors clustered by metropolitan
area, which allow for correlation of household observations within metropolitan areas.
Our specifications do not use a differences-in-differences estimator since husbands’ and
wives’ regressions, as well as singles’, are run separately from one another. As such, they
should not suffer from the understated standard errors highlighted by Bertrand, Duflo,
Mullainathan 2004. At any rate, clustering by metropolitan area should rectify such an
underestimation, if at all present.
We assume sorting within education brackets. We computed the extent of sorting
in our own sample, and found that the spouses’ correlation across education brackets is
about .53, and 58 % of our couples have spouses within the same bracket (high-school
graduates, some college and college-college plus). Those figures are very similar to the
literature acknowledging education assortative mating, so our assumption seems
plausible. In fact, Weiss and Willis (1997) find that the correlation in educational
attainments of spouses is on average .57 and report that this strong correlation is similar
in magnitude to the correlations found in many other samples in the United States and
other countries. We further checked for sorting by education brackets by empirically
testing whether spouses in our main sample are at all affected by sex ratios of other
education groups. A labor supply regression with one sex ratio for each education bracket
and no interaction term yields a non-significant impact of those ratios for either spouse.
We interpret this outcome as evidence of marital sorting within education brackets4.

Data
Estimation is carried out on the March Supplement of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the year 2000. The 2000 U.S. Census is used to construct our education
sex ratio by education brackets, race, and age groups. Husbands and wives from singlefamily households were extracted from the CPS into separate files. Records in these files
were then matched on the household ID code to create a single observation for each
4

We also tried to include one sex ratio for each education bracket in our main specification and found the
same pattern of results for our EduRatios of interest and three non-significant coefficients for the additional
common ratios.
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married couple. Data on labor force activity, income and any variable of interest at the
household level are taken from the March Supplement, to which we merge data on
education ratios from the Summary File 4 of the Census. Summary File 4 (SF4) contains
information compiled from the questions asked to a sample of all people and housing
units and is released as individual files for each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and for the United States overall. We use the cross-tabulations by sex, age,
race and educational attainment to construct separate education ratios for the black and
white population, aged 18 to 64 by metropolitan area5. There are 276 U.S. metropolitan
areas excluding Puerto Rico. Merging those to the CPS data and excluding the
metropolitan ratios’ outliers (top and bottom 2 %) leave us with 173 metropolitan areas.
The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and female labor force
participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The two measures of the
prevalence of same-sex unmarried households come from table PCT21 of SF4 and are at
the metropolitan level. The Census records a household as a same-sex union if the
relationship to the householder is specified as “unmarried partner”. We construct two
ratios, the number of homosexual unions out of the total number of households and the
number of lesbian unions out of the total number of households. In our sample, the
covariate education is derived from the education categories that the CPS provides6.
Finally, CPS weights are used to make the sample representative of the US population
and economy.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables by demographic.
In our sample, men on average work more annual hours than women and earn a higher
hourly wage, while they have very similar levels of education. On average, husbands are
two years older than wives. As to our education sex ratio by metropolitan area, there are
more white women graduating from high school, or having some college education, than

5

The age brackets in SF4 (PCT65) are 18-24; 25-34; 35-44 and 45-64 and the education categories are: less
than 9th grade; 9th- 12th grade-no diploma; high school graduate-high school diploma, or the equivalent;
some college but no degree; Associate degree; Bachelor’s degree; Master’s degree; Graduate or
professional degree.
6
Those are: less than 1st grade; 1st-4th grade; 5th or 6th grade; 7th or 8th grade; 10th grade; 11th grade; 12th
grade-no diploma; high school graduate-high school diploma, or the equivalent; some college but no
degree; associate degree in college-occupational/vocational program; associate degree in college-academic
program; bachelor’s degree; master’s degree; professional school degree and doctorate degree.
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white men. On the other hand, there are more white men than women holding a college
degree or above. The pattern is somewhat different for the black population: fewer black
women hold a high school diploma relative to black men but they are more numerous in
the “some college” and “college-college plus” categories.

IV. Results
IV.1 Main evidence
The main results are shown in Table 2. The estimated effects of our quality sex
ratio are positive for husbands and negative for wives, as predicted by the theory.
Additionally, couples with CC wives exhibit a stronger response to the quality sex ratio
on their bargaining power than couples with “some college” wives. In turn, SC wives
estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is larger than for high school graduates wives. The
point estimates in our sample indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the education
sex ratio reduces SC wives’ annual labor supply by about 7.8 hours (p-value = .01), while
their husbands’ is increased by 5.4 hours per year (p-value = .006). As to couples with
CC wives, their coefficients for the education sex ratio show a decline in wives’ labor
supply by 16.6 hours (p-value = .009), and an increase in their husbands’ by 13.0 hours
per year (p-value = .005). The evidence clearly shows that for both husbands and wives
the estimates for the “college-college plus” are greater than for “some college”, the
coefficients being statistically different from each other for each spouse. This suggests
that changes in the sex ratio of one’s education group have a stronger effect on
bargaining power if one is highly educated.
The signal conveyed by the education sex ratio about the quality of outside
marriage market opportunities is more powerfully received by highly educated wives and
husbands because education is positively related to other important mate attributes such
as wealth, income and success in life. The availability of valuable mates in the marriage
market represents a more credible threat for spouses that are per se high-quality mates
than the sex ratio for lower education brackets. This is in line with the prediction by
Iyigun, Walsh (2005), in which imbalances in the sex ratios become more relevant for
intra-household allocations as the rank of couples in the assortative order rises, measured
here by educational attainment. Moreover, our results also match evidence in the
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literature of stronger educational homogamy for highly educated men and women (Qian
1998). For instance, today college graduates have become increasingly likely to marry
one another rather than marry non-college graduates. The probability of having a spouse
with the same educational background is 4 times higher than the possibility of marrying
to someone who does not (Mare, Schwartz 2005). Finally, high-school graduates do not
show any significant response to changing ratios7.
As to the size of our sex ratio effects, those changes correspond to a 4.4 (9.3)
percent reduction of the average annual hours worked by “some college” (“collegecollege plus”) married women8 and to a 2.3 (5.7) percent increase for their corresponding
husbands’. These effects are sizable, given the acknowledged rigidities in the husbands’
labor supply and the frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of
work per week. In particular, the impact on husbands is remarkable since traditional
family analyses do not emphasize husbands’ response to the sex ratio, even less so, their
labor supply increasing with it.
We also estimated the impact of our quality sex ratio on a sub-sample of couples
that did actually sort in marriage by education bracket, i.e. on couples where wives’
education belongs to the same education bracket as their husbands’. We found a similar
pattern of results as in our main specification.
The bargaining power effect is also estimated on unmarried individuals,
separately for men and women. Their labor supply regressions show no significant
impact of the education sex ratio, as theory would predict. Both men and women exhibit
economically negligible and statistically insignificant coefficients of the sex ratio by
education brackets and of its interactions (Table 2). No additional impact is found for
“some college” and “college-college plus”. At any rate, all their coefficients are different
from the couples’ sample, which emphasizes the bargaining power effect on husbands
and wives. Only the coefficient concerning the impact on high-school graduates has a
7

Couples where the wife is a high-school graduate do not seem to be affected by the relative number of
men and women that are high-school graduates in their metropolitan area. The absence of such a bargaining
power effect may be due to the lack of sorting behavior by this demographic group; it may also be due to
strong rigidities in the labor supply schedules of such low-educated couples. See subsection IV for a more
detailed discussion.
8
This decline in wives’ labor supply does not appear to be driven by women less attached to the labor force
being in the labor market and working fewer hours. Female participation in the labor market does not
exhibit any positive significant impact of the bargaining power effect of the quality sex ratio.
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large magnitude, especially for single men. However, the coefficients are never
significant and the singles’ very small sample size may explain the imprecise estimate9.
The empirical results are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase
female bargaining power in the marriage market. Furthermore, this evidence represents
the first empirical support of the bargaining power effect of a quality sex ratio by
education and of its stronger impact especially as higher levels of educational attainment
are considered. Further evidence presented below, together with the discussion of various
alternative explanations, should help making this claim convincing.

IV.2 Race
Running our main labor supply specification on the sub-sample of white
couples yields the same results as the full sample regressions (Table 4). The education
sex ratio10 has a negative effect on wives’ labor supply and positive effects on husbands’,
with a significantly stronger impact for the “college-college plus” than for “some
college”. The coefficient of high-school graduates is not significant. Specifically, “some
college” wives experience a reduction in their annual hours of 76.6 (p-value = 0.03) while
their spouses increase theirs by 42.2 (p-value = 0.05). Moreover, wives in the highest
education category reduce their annual hours worked by 171.7 hours (p-value = 0.01),
and their spouses experience an increase of 136.3 annual hours (p-value = 0.01). The very
small black population in the CPS didn’t allow us to run the same regressions for only
black couples. Nevertheless, in our full sample, we ran a similar regression to check
whether the bargaining power effect of our within-race quality sex ratio varies across
races. Each of the three variables concerning the sex ratio by education is interacted with
a dummy variable for race, in order to capture a possible differential effect. No evidence
of a different impact across races was detected; however, the several sex ratio coefficients
in that regression became highly collinear.

IV.3 Impact for older and younger couples
9

The estimated negative coefficient for single women and positive for single men may be due to some of
them planning to marry in the future and thus mildly experiencing a possible bargaining power effect in
expected value (although not different across education brackets).
10
For the white sub-sample, EduRatio is computed using data only for white men and women.
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The bargaining power effect of our sex ratio by education is also estimated on
sub-samples of older couples and younger couples, using the same specification as above.
We actually find an interesting pattern (Table 3). Couples in their late thirties and above
exhibit a stronger impact of the sex ratio for “some college” than in the entire sample,
and an even higher response for the “college-college plus” category, especially for wives.
The associated decline in wives’ labor supply is 82 annual hours for SC and 259 annual
hours for CC. The role of high-school graduates sex ratio is still negligible. On the
contrary, for couples in their twenties and early thirties the bargaining power effect is
significant for high-school graduates while not being different across education brackets,
and it is greater than all the coefficients for the entire sample and for the “old” subsample (the decline in wives’ labor supply is 750). We believe that those results reflect
different informational values about the quality of potential mates that educational
attainment conveys at different stages of life. When young, education is not yet a good
predictor of quality such as wealth and success in life because one hasn’t had time to
extract the benefits from education yet. The sex ratio in one’s education group matters,
also for high-school graduates, but there is no stronger impact for high brackets because
more education cannot convey much more prosperity information. Also, high-school
graduates do show a sorting behavior, probably because at such young an age, highschool graduates are actually more likely to marry individuals in their education category,
if not because they know and interact with more such people. Instead, at older ages
education becomes a better proxy for economic prosperity because there was time to
establish social status and wealth. Especially if one has a high educational attainment, the
signal given by the education sex ratio is very quality-informative, so that the effect of
such outside marriage market opportunities on bargaining power is very strong.
Education matters more in marriage choices when prosperity is directly at stake: this is
the case for “older” couples looking at their marriage prospects, since the benefits from
education are already present. Evidence from the literature actually suggests that later age
at union promotes stronger educational homogamy. In particular, men and women aged
30 or above are less likely to be with partners with a different level of educational
attainment than are persons in their twenties (Qian 1998).
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IV.4 High-school graduates
Bargaining power in households where the wife is a high-school graduate does
not seem to be affected by the relative number of men and women that are high-school
graduates in their metropolitan area. Possibly, those individuals do not exhibit assortative
sorting behavior by education because the bracket is too narrow and they may also look
for mates “above”, in the “some college” pool. To test this hypothesis, we thus
constructed a modified quality sex ratio, in which couples with a high-school graduate
wife are associated with the sex ratio of high-school graduates plus “some college” men
and women. We kept the assumptions about the assortative mating of the other two
groups of individuals “some college” and “college-college plus”. There is no evidence to
support the hypothesis. The bargaining power effect for them is not significant for
husband or wife, while for “some college” and “college-college plus” couples it remains
significant, and with an increasing impact along educational brackets. High-school
graduates do not appear to “think” assortatively in terms of outside marriage market
opportunities or match with “some college” individuals. We suggest that this lack of an
education sex ratio effect on current high-school graduates could be due to the fact that
high-school graduates do not have good marital prospects in terms of their educational
attainment, so they just do not sort and are not affected by the specific quality dimension
“education”. This is in line with the empirical evidence from the literature that mainly
highly educated men and women are likely to marry each other (Qian 1998).
Additionally, it is compatible with the theoretical prediction (Iyigun Walsh 2005) of an
increasing bargaining power effect of the sex ratios as the assortative order rises, which is
empirically supported by our main results: for low ranks such as high-school-graduates,
the impact can be negligible.

V. Alternative explanations
Sex ratios as proxy of local labor market opportunities
It may be possible that the labor supply of married women falls not as a result of
the bargaining power effect of mate availability by education brackets, but due to poor
local economic opportunities for women. High values of our quality sex ratio by
metropolitan area may suggest male workers outnumbering female workers and a local
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labor market with gloomy perspectives in female opportunities. Similarly, it could be that
more educated women, whose labor supply is high, live in metropolitan areas where there
are better job opportunities for them, so that the negative coefficient of our education
ratio represents labor market fluctuations instead of bargaining power. There are at least
three reasons to believe that local economy does not provide a plausible alternative
explanation for our findings. First, our labor supply regressions include individuals’
wages and experience, state unemployment rate, total labor force participation rate and
female labor force participation rate, which help account for the effects of variation in
labor market opportunities, specifically for women. Second, it is difficult to understand
why the labor supply of men married to those women, but not other men, should be
higher in those metropolitan areas if it were just a labor market fluctuation. Third, single
women with similar demographic and labor market characteristics did not experience the
same impact of the sex ratios as married women.

Sex ratio including married and same-sex partners
It may seem that our education sex ratio does not capture the actual availability of mates
in a local marriage market because both married individuals and same-sex partners, are
included in the computation of our variable. Its lack of significance in our unmarried
samples may be attributed to large percentages of unmarried men or women having
same-sex partners. We believe that our ratio of the total number of men and women
present in a metropolitan area does represent a reliable sex-ratio for three main reasons.
First, there is considerable evidence in the literature that relatively little benefit is realized
from refinements such as computing sex ratios separately by marital status (Fosset and
Kiecolt 1991; Freiden 1974). Second, we control for the prevalence of same-sex
unmarried households using Census data and constructing two ratios: the number of
homosexual relationships out of the total number of households and the number of
lesbian relationships out of the total number of households. With those measures at the
metropolitan area, we make sure that our education sex ratio is an index of the tightness
of the heterosexual marriage markets. Finally, to the extent that the sizes of the male and
female homosexual populations vary together, their impact on the validity of the sex ratio
would be reduced (Fosset and Kiecolt 1991).
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Marital gains from specialization
It is well known that if the education of the husband is higher than the wife’s, there are
gains from the wife specializing in household production and thus working less in the
labor market (Becker 1981, Chiappori et al. 2006). Our quality sex ratio may capture the
presence of those gains, showing that when the education gap of married couples
increases (i.e. the number of highly educated men increases, married women’s labor
supply decreases and their husbands’ increases). However, this link cannot represent an
alternative explanation to our bargaining power interpretation for three reasons. First, our
sample consists of already married couples, and the sex ratio counts all men and women
regardless of their marital status, while the specialization effect should be present only for
couples formed after any sex ratio change. When we restrict our sample to “older”
couples, likely to have married many years prior to 2000, our bargaining power
interpretation still holds. Second, we consider positive assortative mating within
education brackets, so that men and women are affected by fluctuations in the sex ratio
only in their own education group. In this case, the education gap of potential spouses,
and the corresponding gains from specialization would be very small. Third, when we
restrict our sample to couples that did indeed perfectly sort by those education brackets,
(i.e. no peculiar gain from specialization should be present for them) our results still hold.

Welfare programs for women
Welfare programs favorable to women may discourage female labor supply or
increase the bargaining power of married women by enhancing the value of single
motherhood. However, by definition, welfare programs benefit only low-income
households, while our results hold for all levels of income. In particular, when lowincome households are removed from our samples, there is still a significant decrease in
married women’s labor supply and increase in their husbands’, with differential impacts
across education brackets, also in the white sub-sample. Additionally, there is no reason
why the pattern of the main welfare benefits such as AFDC, EITC and mandated benefits
should vary across metropolitan areas to be more favorable to women in areas where
women are relatively scarce. Regardless, the controls for income, wages, and number of
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children should capture welfare mechanisms and effects of welfare eligibility in our main
regressions.

VI. Conclusions
This paper further explores the role of sex ratios on bargaining power, by
constructing a quality sex ratio by education brackets and testing whether it affects the
intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding education brackets,
within the framework of a collective labor supply household model. Additionally, we also
test the prediction that the bargaining power effect of our sex ratio is greater as the
assortative mating order by education increases. Using CPS and Census data for year
2000, we find that married women significantly reduce their supply of market labor,
while their husbands increase theirs as the corresponding education sex ratio becomes
more favorable to women. Consistent with the hypothesis of a stronger effect for higher
education brackets, couples with “college-college plus” wives exhibit a stronger impact
of the quality sex ratio on their bargaining power than couples with “some college”
wives, whose estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is in turn larger than for high-school
graduates. Our bargaining power interpretation is strengthened by the fact that unmarried
men and women do not exhibit any significant impact of the sex ratio on their labor
supply. Alternative explanations such as local labor market opportunities, marital gains
from specialization, welfare programs, and inclusion of married and same-sex partners in
the sex ratio, are rejected.
The findings presented here are consistent with theories where higher sex ratios
increase female bargaining power in the marriage market. Additionally, this evidence
represents the first empirical support of the bargaining power effect of a quality sex ratio
by education and of its stronger impact as higher levels of educational attainment are
considered.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics

White
Variable
Education Ratio High School Graduates
Education Ratio Some College
Education Ratio College and above
Number of observations

Black

mean

std. dev

mean

std. dev

0.98
0.89
1.02
173

0.06
0.04
0.06

1.22
0.94
0.95
173

0.63
0.43
0.48

Couples
Variable

mean

Hours worked by wife*
Hours worked by husband*
Log of wage of wife*
Log of wage of husband*
Age of husband
Age of wife
Education of husband
Education of wife
Household non-labor income
Number of children below age 6
Number of family members
Dummy for black
Number of observations

std. dev

1775.59
679.24
2287.7
510
2.55
0.66
2.93
0.56
40.9
8.13
38.9
7.97
14.3
2.28
14.2
2.15
5396.18 13685.73
0.34
0.63
3.39
1.15
0.1
0.3
6198
Single Women

Variable
Hours worked*
Log of wage*
Age
Education
Household non-labor income
Number of children below age 6
Number of family members
Dummy for black
Number of observations

Single Men

mean

std. dev

mean

std. dev

1792.02
2.24
33.35
13.29
3016.43
0.47
2.73
0.59
540

630.98
0.66
8.01
1.69
5789.97
0.69
1.01
0.49

2122.07
2.63
37.1
13.71
4326.6
0.1
2.38
0.32
129

556.56
0.53
8.27
2.11
9537.48
0.39
0.84
0.46

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000 and U.S. Census 2000.
*For women and men with positive hours of work.
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Table 2. Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked, Couples and Singles
Estimated Coefficient / robust standard errors / sample size (significant estimates in bold)
Wives

Husbands

Edu Ratio

-65.32
(-89.87)

-86.68
(-96.13)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-78.29
(-30.01)

53.56
(19.33)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

-166.21
(-62.87)
6198

129.80
(46.05)
6198

Number of observations

Single Women

Single Men

Edu Ratio

186.71
(271.31)

784.78
(707.54)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-29.56
(99.45)

-109.27
(246.57)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

37.36
(242.40)
540

-431.90
(316.20)
129

Number of observations

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section III
Single individuals are defined as those with marital status "never married".
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Table 3. Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked, White Couples
Estimated Coefficient / robust standard errors / sample size (significant estimates in bold)
Wives

Husbands

Edu Ratio

78.42
(178.04)

-179.71
(152.75)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-76.58
(35.19)

42.17
(21.79)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

-171.71
(69.31)
5762

136.29
(52.51)
5762

Number of observations

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section III.
Table 4. Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked by Wives, by Age Group
Estimated Coefficient / robust standard errors / sample size (significant estimates in bold)
Young couples

Old Couples

Edu Ratio

-750.33
(363.82)

26.96
(83.65)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-113.90
(75.14)

-82.13
(34.09)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

30.33
(144.90)
1204

-259.54
(88.67)
4074

Number of observations

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section III.
Young couples are those with wives aged 22 to 31 and husbands aged 25 to 35; old couples wives are aged 32 to 55 and husbands 37 to 57.

21
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

23

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 103 [2007]

NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html
http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html
http://www.repec.org
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu

NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2006
SIEV

1.2006

CCMP

2.2006

CCMP
KTHC

3.2006
4.2006

SIEV

5.2006

CCMP

6.2006

PRCG
SIEV
CTN
CTN
NRM

7.2006
8.2006
9.2006
10.2006
11.2006

NRM

12.2006

CCMP
KTHC
KTHC
CSRM

13.2006
14.2006
15.2006
16.2006

CCMP

17.2006

IEM
CTN

18.2006
19.2006

CCMP

20.2006

SIEV

21.2006

CCMP

22.2006

NRM

23.2006

NRM

24.2006

SIEV

25.2006

SIEV

26.2006

KTHC

27.2006

CCMP

28.2006

IEM

29.2006

KTHC
ETA

30.2006
31.2006

IEM

32.2006

NRM

33.2006

CTN

34.2006

IEM
ETA

35.2006
36.2006

Anna ALBERINI: Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs:
The Case of Colorado
Valentina BOSETTI, Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Stabilisation Targets, Technical Change and the
Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Change Control
Roberto ROSON: Introducing Imperfect Competition in CGE Models: Technical Aspects and Implications
Sergio VERGALLI: The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics
Fabio GRAZI, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Piet RIETVELD: Modeling Spatial Sustainability: Spatial
Welfare Economics versus Ecological Footprint
Olivier DESCHENES and Michael GREENSTONE: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from
Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather
Michele MORETTO and Paola VALBONESE: Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach
Anna ALBERINI and Aline CHIABAI: Discount Rates in Risk v. Money and Money v. Money Tradeoffs
Jon X. EGUIA: United We Vote
Shao CHIN SUNG and Dinko DIMITRO: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games
Fabio CERINA (lxxviii): Tourism Specialization and Sustainability: A Long-Run Policy Analysis
Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxxviii): Benchmarking in Tourism
Destination, Keeping in Mind the Sustainable Paradigm
Jens HORBACH: Determinants of Environmental Innovation – New Evidence from German Panel Data Sources
Fabio SABATINI: Social Capital, Public Spending and the Quality of Economic Development: The Case of Italy
Fabio SABATINI: The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective
Giuseppe DI VITA: Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence
Rob B. DELLINK and Marjan W. HOFKES: The Timing of National Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in
the Presence of Other Environmental Policies
Philippe QUIRION: Distributional Impacts of Energy-Efficiency Certificates Vs. Taxes and Standards
Somdeb LAHIRI: A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems
Massimiliano MAZZANTI and Roberto ZOBOLI: Examining the Factors Influencing Environmental
Innovations
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Work Incentive and Labor Supply
Marzio GALEOTTI, Matteo MANERA and Alessandro LANZA: On the Robustness of Robustness Checks of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: When is it Optimal to Exhaust a Resource in a Finite Time?
Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Value of Employment and Natural Resource
Extinction
Lucia VERGANO and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Analysis and Evaluation of Ecosystem Resilience: An Economic
Perspective
Danny CAMPBELL, W. George HUTCHINSON and Riccardo SCARPA: Using Discrete Choice Experiments to
Derive Individual-Specific WTP Estimates for Landscape Improvements under Agri-Environmental Schemes
Evidence from the Rural Environment Protection Scheme in Ireland
Vincent M. OTTO, Timo KUOSMANEN and Ekko C. van IERLAND: Estimating Feedback Effect in Technical
Change: A Frontier Approach
Giovanni BELLA: Uniqueness and Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Model with Polluting Emissions
Alessandro COLOGNI and Matteo MANERA: The Asymmetric Effects of Oil Shocks on Output Growth: A
Markov-Switching Analysis for the G-7 Countries
Fabio SABATINI: Social Capital and Labour Productivity in Italy
Andrea GALLICE (lxxix): Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret
Andrea BIGANO and Paul SHEEHAN: Assessing the Risk of Oil Spills in the Mediterranean: the Case of the
Route from the Black Sea to Italy
Rinaldo BRAU and Davide CAO (lxxviii): Uncovering the Macrostructure of Tourists’ Preferences. A Choice
Experiment Analysis of Tourism Demand to Sardinia
Parkash CHANDER and Henry TULKENS: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International
Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion
Valeria COSTANTINI and Salvatore MONNI: Environment, Human Development and Economic Growth
Ariel RUBINSTEIN (lxxix): Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper103

24

Oreffice and Bercea: Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household Ba

ETA

37.2006

ETA

38.2006

ETA

39.2006

CCMP

40.2006

IEM

41.2006

CCMP

42.2006

KTHC

43.2006

CCMP

44.2006

SIEV

45.2006

NRM

46.2006

KTHC

47.2006

KTHC

48.2006

KTHC

49.2006

KTHC

50.2006

KTHC

51.2006

KTHC

52.2006

KTHC
KTHC

53.2006
54.2006

KTHC

55.2006

KTHC

56.2006

KTHC

57.2006

KTHC
KTHC

58.2006
59.2006

KTHC

60.2006

KTHC

61.2006

KTHC

62.2006

KTHC

63.2006

KTHC

64.2006

KTHC

65.2006

KTHC

66.2006

KTHC

67.2006

KTHC

68.2006

KTHC

69.2006

KTHC

70.2006

ETA

71.2006

CTN

72.2006

CTN

73.2006

CTN
CTN
CTN

74.2006
75.2006
76.2006

CTN

77.2006

CTN
CTN

78.2006
79.2006

Maria SALGADeO (lxxix): Choosing to Have Less Choice
Justina A.V. FISCHER and Benno TORGLER: Does Envy Destroy Social Fundamentals? The Impact of Relative
Income Position on Social Capital
Benno TORGLER, Sascha L. SCHMIDT and Bruno S. FREY: Relative Income Position and Performance: An
Empirical Panel Analysis
Alberto GAGO, Xavier LABANDEIRA, Fidel PICOS And Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Taxing Tourism In Spain:
Results and Recommendations
Karl van BIERVLIET, Dirk Le ROY and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: An Accidental Oil Spill Along the Belgian
Coast: Results from a CV Study
Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas
Giulio CAINELLI and Donato IACOBUCCI: The Role of Agglomeration and Technology in Shaping Firm
Strategy and Organization
Alvaro CALZADILLA, Francesco PAULI and Roberto ROSON: Climate Change and Extreme Events: An
Assessment of Economic Implications
M.E. KRAGT, P.C. ROEBELING and A. RUIJS: Effects of Great Barrier Reef Degradation on Recreational
Demand: A Contingent Behaviour Approach
C. GIUPPONI, R. CAMERA, A. FASSIO, A. LASUT, J. MYSIAK and A. SGOBBI: Network Analysis, Creative
System Modelling and DecisionSupport: The NetSyMoD Approach
Walter F. LALICH (lxxx): Measurement and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in
Sydney
Elena PASPALANOVA (lxxx): Cultural Diversity Determining the Memory of a Controversial Social Event
Ugo GASPARINO, Barbara DEL CORPO and Dino PINELLI (lxxx): Perceived Diversity of Complex
Environmental Systems: Multidimensional Measurement and Synthetic Indicators
Aleksandra HAUKE (lxxx): Impact of Cultural Differences on Knowledge Transfer in British, Hungarian and
Polish Enterprises
Katherine MARQUAND FORSYTH and Vanja M. K. STENIUS (lxxx): The Challenges of Data Comparison and
Varied European Concepts of Diversity
Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxxx): Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and
Evidence from the U.S.
Monica BARNI (lxxx): From Statistical to Geolinguistic Data: Mapping and Measuring Linguistic Diversity
Lucia TAJOLI and Lucia DE BENEDICTIS (lxxx): Economic Integration and Similarity in Trade Structures
Suzanna CHAN (lxxx): “God’s Little Acre” and “Belfast Chinatown”: Diversity and Ethnic Place Identity in
Belfast
Diana PETKOVA (lxxx): Cultural Diversity in People’s Attitudes and Perceptions
John J. BETANCUR (lxxx): From Outsiders to On-Paper Equals to Cultural Curiosities? The Trajectory of
Diversity in the USA
Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxxx): Cultural Diversity A Glimpse Over the Current Debate in Sweden
Emilio GREGORI (lxxx): Indicators of Migrants’ Socio-Professional Integration
Christa-Maria LERM HAYES (lxxx): Unity in Diversity Through Art? Joseph Beuys’ Models of Cultural
Dialogue
Sara VERTOMMEN and Albert MARTENS (lxxx): Ethnic Minorities Rewarded: Ethnostratification on the Wage
Market in Belgium
Nicola GENOVESE and Maria Grazia LA SPADA (lxxx): Diversity and Pluralism: An Economist's View
Carla BAGNA (lxxx): Italian Schools and New Linguistic Minorities: Nationality Vs. Plurilingualism. Which
Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?
Vedran OMANOVIĆ (lxxx): Understanding “Diversity in Organizations” Paradigmatically and Methodologically
Mila PASPALANOVA (lxxx): Identifying and Assessing the Development of Populations of Undocumented
Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels
Roberto ALZETTA (lxxx): Diversities in Diversity: Exploring Moroccan Migrants’ Livelihood in Genoa
Monika SEDENKOVA and Jiri HORAK (lxxx): Multivariate and Multicriteria Evaluation of Labour Market
Situation
Dirk JACOBS and Andrea REA (lxxx): Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in
The Netherlands and Belgium
Eric M. USLANER (lxxx): Does Diversity Drive Down Trust?
Paula MOTA SANTOS and João BORGES DE SOUSA (lxxx): Visibility & Invisibility of Communities in Urban
Systems
Rinaldo BRAU and Matteo LIPPI BRUNI: Eliciting the Demand for Long Term Care Coverage: A Discrete
Choice Modelling Analysis
Dinko DIMITROV and Claus-JOCHEN HAAKE: Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
Ottorino CHILLEM, Benedetto GUI and Lorenzo ROCCO: On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions
Under Adverse Selection
Sylvain BEAL and Nicolas QUÉROU: Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
Sophie BADE, Guillaume HAERINGER and Ludovic RENOU: Bilateral Commitment
Andranik TANGIAN: Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections
Rudolf BERGHAMMER, Agnieszka RUSINOWSKA and Harrie de SWART: Applications of Relations and
Graphs to Coalition Formation
Paolo PIN: Eight Degrees of Separation
Roland AMANN and Thomas GALL: How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

25

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 103 [2007]

CTN
CCMP

80.2006
81.2006

CSRM

82.2006

CTN

83.2006

PRCG

84.2006

CCMP

85.2006

CCMP

86.2006

KTHC

87.2006

CCMP

88.2006

CCMP

89.2006

SIEV

90.2006

PRCG
CCMP

91.2006
92.2006

CCMP

93.2006

CCMP

94.2006

CCMP

95.2006

CCMP

96.2006

KTHC

97.2006

CCMP

98.2006

PRCG

99.2006

NRM

100.2006

NRM

101.2006

CCMP

102.2006

KTHC

103.2006

SIEV

104.2006

NRM

105.2006

PRCG

106.2006

CCMP

107.2006

NRM

108.2006

PRCG
KTHC
KTHC

109.2006
110.2006
111.2006

IEM

112.2006

SIEV

113.2006

CCMP

114.2006

NRM

115.2006

CCMP

116.2006

CCMP

117.2006

Maria MONTERO: Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity
Vincent M. OTTO, Andreas LÖSCHEL and John REILLY: Directed Technical Change and Climate Policy
Nicoletta FERRO: Riding the Waves of Reforms in Corporate Law, an Overview of Recent Improvements in
Italian Corporate Codes of Conduct
Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary
Democracy
Raphaël SOUBEYRAN: Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate
Choose an Extremist Position?
Eduardo L. GIMÉNEZ and Miguel RODRÍGUEZ: Pigou’s Dividend versus Ramsey’s Dividend in the Double
Dividend Literature
Andrea BIGANO, Jacqueline M. HAMILTON and Richard S.J. TOL: The Impact of Climate Change on
Domestic and International Tourism: A Simulation Study
Fabio SABATINI: Educational Qualification, Work Status and Entrepreneurship in Italy an Exploratory Analysis
Richard S.J. TOL: The Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An Application of
Fund
Philippe TULKENS and Henry TULKENS: The White House and The Kyoto Protocol: Double Standards on
Uncertainties and Their Consequences
Andrea M. LEITER and Gerald J. PRUCKNER: Proportionality of Willingness to Pay to Small Risk Changes –
The Impact of Attitudinal Factors in Scope Tests
Raphäel SOUBEYRAN: When Inertia Generates Political Cycles
Alireza NAGHAVI: Can R&D-Inducing Green Tariffs Replace International Environmental Regulations?
Xavier PAUTREL: Reconsidering The Impact of Environment on Long-Run Growth When Pollution Influences
Health and Agents Have Finite-Lifetime
Corrado Di MARIA and Edwin van der WERF: Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with
Directed Technical Change
Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Chiara M. TRAVISI: Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocations Payments in Financing
Rail Noise Abatement Programs: Results from a CE valuation study in Italy
Timo KUOSMANEN and Mika KORTELAINEN: Valuing Environmental Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis Using
Data Envelopment Analysis
Dermot LEAHY and Alireza NAGHAVI: Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs.
Joint Ventures
Inmaculada MARTÍNEZ-ZARZOSO, Aurelia BENGOCHEA-MORANCHO and Rafael MORALES LAGE: The
Impact of Population on CO2 Emissions: Evidence from European Countries
Alberto CAVALIERE and Simona SCABROSETTI: Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to
Political Economy
Khaled ABU-ZEID and Sameh AFIFI: Multi-Sectoral Uses of Water & Approaches to DSS in Water
Management in the NOSTRUM Partner Countries of the Mediterranean
Carlo GIUPPONI, Jaroslav MYSIAK and Jacopo CRIMI: Participatory Approach in Decision Making Processes
for Water Resources Management in the Mediterranean Basin
Kerstin RONNEBERGER, Maria BERRITTELLA, Francesco BOSELLO and Richard S.J. TOL: Klum@Gtap:
Introducing Biophysical Aspects of Land-Use Decisions Into a General Equilibrium Model A Coupling
Experiment
Avner BEN-NER, Brian P. McCALL, Massoud STEPHANE, and Hua WANG: Identity and Self-Other
Differentiation in Work and Giving Behaviors: Experimental Evidence
Aline CHIABAI and Paulo A.L.D. NUNES: Economic Valuation of Oceanographic Forecasting Services: A CostBenefit Exercise
Paola MINOIA and Anna BRUSAROSCO: Water Infrastructures Facing Sustainable Development Challenges:
Integrated Evaluation of Impacts of Dams on Regional Development in Morocco
Carmine GUERRIERO: Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and
Evidence
Richard S.J. TOL, Stephen W. PACALA and Robert SOCOLOW: Understanding Long-Term Energy Use and
Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the Usa
Carles MANERA and Jaume GARAU TABERNER: The Recent Evolution and Impact of Tourism in the
Mediterranean: The Case of Island Regions, 1990-2002
Carmine GUERRIERO: Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence
John FOOT (lxxx): Mapping Diversity in Milan. Historical Approaches to Urban Immigration
Donatella CALABI: Foreigners and the City: An Historiographical Exploration for the Early Modern Period
Andrea BIGANO, Francesco BOSELLO and Giuseppe MARANO: Energy Demand and Temperature: A
Dynamic Panel Analysis
Anna ALBERINI, Stefania TONIN, Margherita TURVANI and Aline CHIABAI: Paying for Permanence: Public
Preferences for Contaminated Site Cleanup
Vivekananda MUKHERJEE and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and
Trade with Complete Specialization
Clive LIPCHIN: A Future for the Dead Sea Basin: Water Culture among Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians
Barbara BUCHNER, Carlo CARRARO and A. Denny ELLERMAN: The Allocation of European Union
Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles
Richard S.J. TOL: Carbon Dioxide Emission Scenarios for the Usa

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper103

26

Oreffice and Bercea: Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household Ba

NRM

118.2006

SIEV

119.2006

SIEV

120.2006

CCMP

121.2006

ETA

122.2006

KTHC

123.2006

PRCG

124.2006

SIEV

125.2006

SIEV

126.2006

CTN

127.2006

SIEV

128.2006

CCMP

129.2006

IEM

130.2006

PRCG

131.2006

IEM

132.2006

ETA

133.2006

Isabel CORTÉS-JIMÉNEZ and Manuela PULINA: A further step into the ELGH and TLGH for Spain and Italy
Beat HINTERMANN, Anna ALBERINI and Anil MARKANDYA: Estimating the Value of Safety with Labor
Market Data: Are the Results Trustworthy?
Elena STRUKOVA, Alexander GOLUB and Anil MARKANDYA: Air Pollution Costs in Ukraine
Massimiliano MAZZANTI, Antonio MUSOLESI and Roberto ZOBOLI: A Bayesian Approach to the Estimation
of Environmental Kuznets Curves for CO2 Emissions
Jean-Marie GRETHER, Nicole A. MATHYS, and Jaime DE MELO: Unraveling the World-Wide Pollution
Haven Effect
Sergio VERGALLI: Entry and Exit Strategies in Migration Dynamics
Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Valentina MILELLA: Privatization in Western Europe Stylized Facts, Outcomes
and Open Issues
Pietro CARATTI, Ludovico FERRAGUTO and Chiara RIBOLDI: Sustainable Development Data Availability on
the Internet
S. SILVESTRI, M PELLIZZATO and V. BOATTO: Fishing Across the Centuries: What Prospects for the Venice
Lagoon?
Alison WATTS: Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups
Danny CAMPBELL, W. George HUTCHINSON and Riccardo SCARPA: Lexicographic Preferences in Discrete
Choice Experiments: Consequences on Individual-Specific Willingness to Pay Estimates
Giovanni BELLA: Transitional Dynamics Towards Sustainability: Reconsidering the EKC Hypothesis
Elisa SCARPA and Matteo MANERA: Pricing and Hedging Illiquid Energy Derivatives: an Application to the
JCC Index
Andrea BELTRATTI and Bernardo BORTOLOTTI: The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market
Alberto LONGO, Anil MARKANDYA and Marta PETRUCCI: The Internalization of Externalities in The
Production of Electricity: Willingness to Pay for the Attributes of a Policy for Renewable Energy
Brighita BERCEA and Sonia OREFFICE: Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household
Bargaining Power

(lxxviii) This paper was presented at the Second International Conference on "Tourism and Sustainable
Economic Development - Macro and Micro Economic Issues" jointly organised by CRENoS (Università
di Cagliari and Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported by the World Bank,
Chia, Italy, 16-17 September 2005.
(lxxix) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Economic Theory and Experimental
Economics" jointly organised by SET (Center for advanced Studies in Economic Theory, University of
Milano-Bicocca) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, Milan, 20-23 November 2005. The Workshop
was co-sponsored by CISEPS (Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Milan-Bicocca).
(lxxx) This paper was presented at the First EURODIV Conference “Understanding diversity: Mapping
and measuring”, held in Milan on 26-27 January 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of
Conferences “Cultural Diversity in Europe: a Series of Conferences.

2006 SERIES
CCMP

Climate Change Modelling and Policy (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )

SIEV

Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)

NRM

Natural Resources Management (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)

KTHC

Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)

IEM

International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera)

CSRM

Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli)

PRCG

Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)

ETA

Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)

CTN

Coalition Theory Network

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

27

